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Hog Insurance Choices with Supply and Demand:   
A Bivariate Probit Model with Partial Observability 
 
Abstract: 
This paper explores the factors that impact insurance choices. Specially designed survey 
questions allow one to fully observe the demand tendency by the farmers and partially observe 
the supply tendency by the insurance company. A joint estimation of insurance decision by both 
supply and demand sides suggested that factors performing different roles in affecting insurance 
participation game. Farmer’s age and education have positive impact on insurance demand, but 
are indifference to the insurance providers. Insurance suppliers care more about farmers’ 
experience in the field, but this experience occasionally results in overconfidence for the farmers 
and hence, impedes insurance purchasing. Production scales, proxy by sow inventory, is put 
more weight by the farmers than the suppliers when making decisions. Production efficiency 
measures, which performs as incentives for farmers to purchase insurance, acts as some 
disadvantages in the suppliers’ point of view. While the suppliers prefer customers who use 
vaccine, the hog producers tend to treat vaccine as a substitute for insurance so as to prevent 
disease risk. The study also generates discussion on the topics such as short-run vs. long-run 
factor impact by comparing past insurance choices and current choices. Information on choices 
regarding different types of insurance (hog and breeding sow) is also discussed. Results from 
bivairate probit model offers deeper understanding about livestock insurance choices and further 
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   1. Introduction 
China is one of the biggest hog exporters in the world. Its annual finished hog production 
takes about one half of the global market. However, most hog operations in China are of small 
scale and lack of effective risk reduction mechanism. Meanwhile, research has shown about 70% 
of the hog operation owners claim livestock disease to be the most deadly shock to their annual 
income and hog production (Patrick et al, 2000). In 2007, hog insurance became widely available 
in China and government also began to offer subsidy to purchase insurance. By the end of June 
2009, there were around 153 million hogs under insured and insurance had been proved to be the 
most effective way for production risk management in hog industry (China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, CIRC, 2009). Despite all these, hog insurance participation rate is still quite low in 
China (i.e. only around 20% for hog insurance in Zhejiang). This paper explores the factors that 
might  impact insurance choices. Using specially designed survey questions, this study 
differentiates the participation tendencies for both supply (insurance companies) and demand 
(farm households) sides. Results from bivairate probit model offers deeper understanding about 
hog insurance choices and further insights to improve policy design and promote participation. 
Agricultural insurance research started as early as 19th century. Generally speaking, in either 
theory or practice, most studies are for crop insurance (for example, Knight and Coble, 1997) 
and very few for livestock. Of those which concentrated on livestock insurance, most research 
addressed questions for product design and market reaction  in  a supplier’s perspective  (for 
example Gramig et al, 2007 and Turvey, 2007) and relatively less study paid attention to the 
demand side. In China, research on livestock insurance started even later. Recently, there exist 
some studies regarding the market demand for hog insurance, such as Cai et al. (2009). But 
research based on micro level data is still very rare.   
Our study contributes the livestock insurance literature in the following ways: First, this is 
one of the very few studies that are based on information and behavior about micro level farm 
households. Second, the specially designed survey allows us to differentiate the participation 
tendency for both farm households and insurance companies and thus, be able to investigate the 
insurance choice as a joint result from both demand and supply sides. Third, the estimation 
method, bivariate probit model with partial observability, which was previously widely used in 
labor and health economics (Poirier, 1980; Berinsky, 2004), is introduced to livestock insurance 
research.   
The data comes from two sources. One is a survey for 531 hog raisers with annual finished 
hog of 100 or more in Deqing County conducted by the Deqing Bureau of Animal Husbandry in 
Zhejiang province, China in 2009. The other part is the claim and settlement information about 
these  531 households which comes from the insurance company.  The survey consists of 
information on demographics, farm management, farm bio-security and micro financial situation 
(such as insurance choices, debt and loan, etc). Data from insurance company consists of 
information about policy coverage, premium, subsidy, reported livestock death and final payment, 
etc.    By using information on insurance choices and self-reported reasons, this data allows us to 
fully observe the farmers’ demand tendency and partially observe the supply tendency by the 
insurance company. Treating the insurance choice as a joint result of both demand and supply 
sides and estimating a biprobit model, results showed that factors performing different roles in 
affecting insurance participation game. Farmer’s  age and education  have positive impact on 
insurance demand, but are indifference to the insurance providers. Instead, insurance suppliers 
care more about farmers’ experience in the field, but for the farmers this experience results in 
overconfidence occasionally and hence, impedes insurance purchasing. Production scales, proxy 
by sow inventory, is put more weight by the farmers than the suppliers when making decisions. 
Production efficiency measures, which performs as incentives for farmers to purchase insurance, 
acts as some disadvantages in the suppliers’ point of view. While the suppliers prefer customers 
who use vaccine, the hog producers tend to treat vaccine as a substitute for insurance so as to 
prevent disease risk.   
The study also generates discussion on the topics like: short-run vs. long-run factor impacts, 
by comparing past insurance choice  history and current insurance  choices; information on 
choices regarding different types of insurance, hog and  breeding sow; and endogenous 
relationship between insurance choice and production security behavior.   
In summary, this study provides explanations for the low participation rate of the livestock 
insurance in China in particular and offers further understanding on how specific factors impact 
insurance choice on both demand and supply sides in general. Better understanding about the 
insurance choice behavior can  help  to promote insurance participation so as to reduce risk, 
smooth income flow, stabilize market supply and increase food security. The insurance suppliers 
will also benefit for marketing development strategies. 
The remaining parts  of this paper are organized as follows:  Section 2 reviews previous 
research on agricultural insurance and livestock insurance. Section 3 outlines the empirical 
models. Section 4 describes the data and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 provides 
discussion and at last, section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Studies on agricultural insurance dated back to as early as 19
th century. Given the very few 
successful cases of insurance operation by private parties, researchers have begun to widely use 
economic theory to explain the insurance market failure since 1970s (For example, Knight and 
Coble  (1999);  Just,  Calvin  and  Quiggin  (1999); Wright  and  Hewitt  (1990);  and  Serra  and 
Goodwin (2003)). 
In developed countries, there exists literature that examined the effect of federal crop 
insurance on farmers’ decisions. For instance, Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) examined how 
crop insurance affects corn farmers’ fertilizer and pesticide use in the US Midwest and found that 
on average, farmers who purchased insurance applied more nitrogen, spent more on pesticides and treated more acreage with both herbicides and insecticides than those without insurance. 
Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal (2004) examined the extent to which crop insurance programs 
have resulted in additional land being brought into production and found that increased 
participation in insurance programs led to statistically significant, but very modest, acreage 
responses. O'Donoghue, Key and Roberts (2007) used a large increase in Federal crop insurance 
subsidies as a natural experiment to examine how harvested acreage and diversification changed 
in response to the policy-induced change in insurance coverage. They found that changes in the 
risk environment do not seem to have large overall effects. 
In developing world, insurance studies were more concentrated on the use of insurance as 
income smoothing, loss prevention and poverty alleviation strategies. Townsend (1994) 
suggested that community-based informal insurance effectively shields villagers from their 
idiosyncratic shocks, thus policymakers should only provide insurance against more aggregate 
shocks. Udry (1994) found that credit contracts with state-contingent repayments plays an 
important role in pooling risks across households in northern Nigeria, even though a fully 
efficient risk-pooling equilibrium is not achieved. 
There also exist studies on insurance take-up rate. Some recent research includes Gine et al. 
(2008) and Cole et al. (2008). Gine et al. (2008) studied the determinants of purchasing an 
innovative rainfall insurance policy offered to small farmers in rural India. They found that 
insurance take-up is decreasing in the basis risk between insurance payouts and income 
fluctuations, increasing in household wealth and decreasing in the extent to which credit 
constraints bind. These results match the predictions of a simple neoclassical model augmented 
with borrowing constraints. However, they also found that risk-averse household are less likely 
to purchase insurance, and participation in village networks and familiarity with the insurance 
vendor are strongly correlated with insurance take-up decisions. Cole et al. (2008) documented 
low levels of rainfall insurance take-up, and then conducted field experiments to understand why 
adoption is so low. Results demonstrated that high price of the insurance and credit constraints of 
the farmers are important determinants of insurance adoption, but also showed evidence that 
endorsement from  a trusted third party about the insurance policy significantly increase the 
insurance take-up.   
Comparing to the studies on crop insurance mentioned above, relatively less research was 
focused on livestock insurance. Among those existing research, most of  them  addressed 
questions for product design and market response in a supplier’s perspective, rather than the 
demand side. Patrick et al. (2000) found 70% hog farmers reported livestock disease as the most 
influential factor for income shock and most farmers adopted risk-reducing production practice 
to cope with risk, such as use of antibiotics and/or vaccine (90%), all-in/all-out production 
system (78%) and segregated early weaning (53%), etc. Gramig et al. (2007) emphasized the 
importance to take into account the farmers’ purchase intention when designing new insurance 
product and suggested failure of doing so would potentially make the government face huge 
payment burden. Shaik et al. (2005) proposed a matrix to compare risk management tools and the insurability conditions and explored the challenges and opportunities of disease risk 
management tools. Turvey (2007) used a general model to illustrate the complexity of the risks at 
the farm level and discussed several possibilities for insuring all risks in a qualitative way. A 
more specific class of net revenue insurance models were presented and evaluated empirically, as 
well.  Green, Driscoll and Bruch (2007) analyzed the data requirement in the design of 
livestock disease risk. Meuwissen (2007) dealt with  designing livestock insurance so as to 
encourage farmers to behave in the interest of the collective and using risk-financing model to 
address systematic risk with a diminishing role for government over time. Grannis, Green and 
Bruch (2007) reported on producer interest in livestock disease insurance in the US and argued 
that since different challenges are faced by producers of each species, segment and operation size, 
a single insurance product will not fit the needs of every livestock producer. 
Recently, Cai et al. (2009) conducted a randomized natural field experiment in China in the 
context of sow insurance and found that providing access to formal insurance significantly 
increases farmers' tendency to raise sows. Evidence also suggested that trust, or lack of 
government-sponsored insurance products is a significant barrier for farmers' willingness to 
participate in the formal insurance program, despite partial premium subsidy from the 
government. 
Our study contributes the literature in the sense that both demand and supply tendencies 
were investigated so as to further understanding the low take-up rate in hog insurance. Using 
micro level household production data and jointly considering both sides in the market 
interaction offered more accurate and reliable suggests and strategies to promote insurance 
participation. 
 
3. Empirical Model 
Bivariate probit model was used in a range of fields in the applied research, but mainly in 
labor and health economics. Depending on the level of observability of dependent variables, the 
model had 3 different types, full observability of both dependent variables, as in Zellner and Lee 
(1965) and Ashford and Sowden (1970); partial observability in the sense of Poirier (1980); and 
the intermediate case, called partial partial observability, such as Farber (1982).  Meng and 
Schmidt (1985) reviewed these three cases, gave discussion on the cost of partial observability 
(defined as the loss of asymptotic efficiency) relative to the full obervability case and suggested 
that due to the high cost, some extra observability information may be worth collecting when 
possible. 
In the bivariate model which underlies all of the above cases, there are 2 binary dependent 
variables, Yj, j=1, 2, each of which is generated by a probit equation and the two error terms in 
the equations are correlated. The two dependent variables could represent either two related 
decisions made by the same agent or decisions made by two different economic agents.   



















j Y are unobservable and are related to the binary dependent variables  j Y by the rule 


















The error terms ( ) 2 1,ε ε will be assumed to be iid as standard bivariate normal with 
correlation ρ . The cases considered above differ in the assumptions about how much 
information about Y1 and Y2 one could observe. 
3.1 Bivariate probit with Full Observability 
The bivariate probit model with full observability dates back to Zellner and Lee (1965).They 
analysed durable goods purchase decisions (buy or not buy) and use of credit decisions (use or 
not use installment credit).They suggested that a joint estimation approach for such relationships 
provided asymptotically more efficient estimators  than single equation estimators if the 
correlations existed among the variables analyzed. They also concluded that the joint estimation 
procedure was flexible in the sense that it could readily be adopted to incorporate exact and 
stochastic restrictions on the parameters of the relationships. 
Ashford and Sowden (1970) estimated parameters for a bivariate probit model  for two 
endogenous variables, breathlessness and wheeze of a coal miner with full observability, taking 
age as the exogenous variable. A coal miner might have a positive response to neither, to one or 
the other, or to both of the symptoms. There were four possible outcomes, all of which were 
distinguishable, since number of individuals within each age group could be found with each 
combination of symptoms.   
Full observability means Y1 and Y2 are fully observed with all the 4 combinations (Y1=1, 
Y2=1), (Y1=1, Y2=0), (Y1=0, Y2=1) and  (Y1=0, Y2=0). This is the case that has the most 
complete information and naturally leads to the most efficient estimates. One can always 
estimate the two probit equations separately. But whenρ is not equal to zero, it is more efficient 
to estimate the two equations simultaneously. The log-likelihood function is   
(3)
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Here  ( ) ρ β β ; , 2 2 1 1 X X F represents the bivariate standard normal distribution function with 
correlationρ , while () ⋅ Φ   is the univariate standard normal distribution function. I=1, 2, …, N 
are the indexes of the observations. Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for all outcomes could then be calculated 
accordingly. To test the hypothesis that the bivariate probit model fits the data better than the 
separate probits, likelihood ratio test could be used. For the separate probits, the joint likelihood 
is just the product of the two separate  (marginal) likelihoods. This means that the joint 
log-likelihood is just the sum of the two log-likelihoods.  One  can compare this joint 
log-likelihood of the separate models to that for the bivariate probit model using a standard LR 
test. 
3.2 Bivariate probit with Partial Observability 
For many cases in the real world, two decisions will be made to jointly determine an 
economic outcome, but as an outsider, one cannot observe the specific responses of the two 
decisions, but can only observe the joint outcome. That is, instead of observing Yi1 and Yi2 for 
all i=1, 2, …, n, one could only observe  i2 i1 i Y  Y = Z ⋅ . Of all the 4 combinations (Yi1=1, Yi2=1), 
(Yi1=1, Yi2=0), (Yi1=0, Yi21) and (Yi1=0, Yi2=0), the last 3 are now indistinguishable. 
An example was given by Poirier (1980). Following from the problem posed by Gunderson 
(1974), Poirier  discussed alternative statistical models for estimating the probability that an 
on-the-job trainee will be retained by the sponsoring company after training. In this situation, the 
employer must decide whether or not to make a job offer, and the trainee must decide whether or 
not he would accept the job offer. Each individual's (either employer's or trainee's) decision is not 
observed; only whether the trainee continues working after training is known. Poirier (1980) 
suggested using a partial observability bivariate probit model because random utility models in 
which the observed binary outcome does not reflect the binary choice of a single decision maker, 
but the joint unobserved binary choices of two decision makers. This model was also used in 
Connolly (1983) to analyse the decision to arbitrate or negotiate the contracts between public 
employees’ unions and municipalities in Michigan. 
Given the available information, two equations must be jointly estimated and the 
log-likelihood function is 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ∑ − − + =
n
i
i i X X F Z X X F Z L ρ β β ρ β β ρ β β ; , 1 ln 1 ; , ln , , ln 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 . 
3.3 Bivariate Probit with Demand Identified 
In some cases, one could observe more than in Poirier's model, but less than in the full 
observability case. Farber (1982) proposed a model for this case to study the demand for 
unionism. Let Yi1 = 1 if individual i wishes to be in a union, and Yi1 = 0 otherwise; let Yi2 =1 if a 
union employer is willing to hire individual i, and Yi2 = 0 otherwise. Individual i is a union 
member (Zi = Yil Yi2 = 1) if both Yi1= 1 and Yi2 = 1, and is not a union member (Zi = 0) 
otherwise; Zi is observed for all i. If nothing more were known, this model would be Poirier's 
model. However, non-union workers in Farber's sample were asked if they desired union 
representation, so that Yi1 is also observed for all i.   On the other hand, Yi2 is observed only if Yi1 = 1. This is so because if Yi1 = 1, then Yi2 = Zi, 
and Zi is observed. However, if Yi1 = 0 we have no information about Yi2. Thus, the first probit 
equation is completely observed, but for the second we have a censored (or selected) sample. 
Note that in terms of the four possible outcomes, two (Yi1 = 0, Yi2 = 1) and (Yi1 = 0, Yi2 = 0) are 
indistinguishable. This is an improvement in observability relative to Poirier's case, where three 
outcomes were indistinguishable.   
Since the first probit equation is fully observed, it can always be estimated separately. 
However, this will be inefficient unless 0 = ρ . Furthermore, there will be selectivity bias in 
separate estimation of the second equation, unless 0 = ρ . The likelihood function for the joint 
estimation of both equations is 
(5)
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Some recently application included but not limit to Devaney and Chien (2000), which used a 
bivariate probit model to analyze  the decision  of employment status and retirement plan 
participation; Newman and Canagarajah (2000), which used a bivariate probit model to compare 
trends in rural poverty by gender for Ghana and Uganda; and Berinsky (2004), which provided 
an example of this model when he examined the attitudes towards race issues. There were also 
studies in labor economics, such as Orellano and Picchetti (2001), Mohanty (2002) and Wetzels 




The data used in this study consists of two parts. One is a survey for 531 hog raisers with 
annual finished hog of 100 or more in Deqing County conducted by the Deqing Bureau of 
Animal Husbandry in Zhejiang province, China in 2009. The other part is the claim and 
settlement information about these 531 households which comes from the insurance company. 
The survey consists of information on demographics, farm management, farm bio-security and 
micro financial situation (such as insurance choices, debt and loan, etc). Data from insurance 
company consists of information about policy coverage, premium, subsidy, reported livestock 
death and final payment, etc.       
4.2 Past and Current Insurance Choices 
4 different insurance statuses are investigated here. Insurance represents the general hog/sow 
insurance participation, which takes value 1 if the farmer either had the insurance before or is 
currently insured or both and 0 if the farmer has never participated in any hog insurance. 
Ins_now represents the current insurance status, which takes value 1 if the farmer is currently insured, either for hog or sow or both and 0 if he/she is not insured in the survey year. Ins_hog 
indicates whether the farmer purchased insurance for hogs in the current year and  ins_sow 
indicates whether the farmer purchased insurance for sows.   
Comparing the estimated results between the first two insurance statuses enable us to 
understand how the factors are different in determining long-term and short-term insurance 
choices. While comparing the estimation between the last two insurance choices could let one 
know how farm owners evaluate each factor when choosing different types of insurance in the 
same given period.   
Table-1 gives the distributions for the 4 insurance choices.  Of the whole sample, 48% 
(N=252) farmers indicated they had experience in participating hog/sow insurance (now or past). 
35% (N=187) farmers were insured (hog or sow) in 2009. That is around 13% farmers who were 
previously insured but not in the year 2009. Of the 35% who were currently insured, nearly all of 
them purchased sow insurance (N=185), and only 119 farmers purchased hog insurance, which 
takes about 22% of the whole sample. 
4.3 Insurance Demand and Supply Identification 
Each of the above 4 insurance choice variables is a joint outcome variable Z as discussed in 
the model in section 3.2. As mentioned, the joint outcome is actually determined by two terms, 
insurance demand intention of the farmer  D Y = 1   and insurance supply intention of the 
insurance company S Y = 2 , and each can take values of 0 or 1. Hence, Z could be considered as 
the product of the two terms and takes value 1 only when D=1 and S=1, and 0 otherwise (i.e. 
D=1, S=0; D=0, S=1; D=0, S=0).   
A specially designed survey question can help to further identify the demand intention of the 
farmers.  The question asked is “For which of the following reasons did you choose Not to 
participate/Quit any insurance?” 7 reasons were given in the question and the farmers were told 
to choose all reasons that apply.   
Of the 7 reasons, reason A “The premium is too high.” was considered to indicate D=0, no 
demand intention, while all other reasons, B to G, such as “Product pool is too narrow”, 
“Coverage is too low”, “Claim is not fair” and “The procedure is too complicated”, etc were all 
considered as D=1 (positive demand intention). These reason designs and determination rules 
followed literature in farm credit demand, such as Feder et al. (1990), Jappelli (1990), Kochar 
(1997), Mushinski (1999) and Boucher (2002, 2005). So far we do not see any study using this 
method in the insurance participation literature. Table-2 gives a list of the reasons, description of 
the identification cases and the distribution statistics for each reason. 
When demand was identified as 1, supply was merely equal to the joint outcome, i.e. S=Z. 
The supply remained inconclusive when D=0. The sample could be then divided into 3 groups, 
(D=1, S=1), (D=1, S=0) and (D=0), where the last group had two indistinguishable sub cases (D=0, S=1) and (D=0, S=0). Table-3 gives the number and the proportion of farmers that fall into 
each group. 
4.4 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables used to predict insurance choices are divided into 3 groups, the 
household demographic group, production group and the security group. Household 
demographics include the farm owner’s age,  education,  experience  (years)  working in hog 
operation and whether the household has any loan  (formal or informal) or not.  Production 
variables include two sub categories, measures for production scale and measures for production 
efficiency. The former has variables like income percentage of hog operation (inc_pctg), hog 
inventory (hoginv) and sow inventory (sowinv). The later has two variables indicate the average 
number of breeds per sow per year (sowbreed) and the annual breed frequency (breedfrq). In the 
security group, there are total cost on quarantine (quarcost), total cost on medicine (medcost), 
average cost of vaccine per hog (hogvac), average cost of vaccine per sow (sowvac), purchase 
extra vaccine other than required or not (buy_vac) and a score ranging from 0-22, which 
indicates the security level in the production procedure. This score is calculated based on 20 
questions regarding the production process.  Table-4 gives the summary statistics  for each 
variable under different insurance cases.   
 
5. Results 
For each of the 4 insurance statuses,  3 models  were estimated, univariate probit model 
(Model 1), bivairate probit model with partial observability (Model 2) and bivariate probit model 
with demand being observed (Model 3). Explanatory variables in demand and supply function 
include demographics, and variables in production scale, efficiency and security as discussed 
above. The only difference between demand and supply function is that demand function has 
loan as one explanatory variable but supply function does not. It is assumed that whether a 
household has loan debt would have an impact on the farmer’s insurance demand intention, but 
not on the insurance company’s supply intention. There are several reasons for this assumption. 
For one thing, loan debt could be used to infer the credit constraint and/or accessibility to credit 
of one household, which was proved to have positive impact on insurance demand (Udry, 1994). 
For another, research also showed that there might exist some substitution effect between loan 
credit and insurance participation in some poor areas, due to the potential possibility to default 
and the extra high premium for insurance (Gine and Yang, 2009). But for insurance provider, the 
loan status should not have any impact. 
5.1 Past Insurance Choices 
Table-5a showed the regression results for insurance choice. Since the positive response in 
the choice variable included  both currently insured farmers and previously insured farmers, 
long-term choice behaviors were discussed here. There are three panels in the table, each 
represents one model. Marginal effects were evaluated at mean level for positive insurance participation, i.e. (D=1, S=1) or Z=1. The log pseudo-likelihood, Wald Chi-squared and the 
percentage of correct predictions were listed on the bottom part of each panel. 
Age was shown to have a positive impact on insurance demand, when the demand and 
supply intention were jointly estimated. Under partial observation of insurance choice (i.e. only 
observe Z=1), the marginal effect at mean age 46.2 for positive insurance participation was about 
0.1%. With demand identified case in the right panel, the marginal effect was even enlarged to 
0.6%, which means one year increase from the mean age would lead to 0.6% increase in the 
possibility to participate in insurance. Education seemed to have no significant impact on either 
demand or supply. Years working in hog operation had a significant positive association with 
supply intention. The marginal effect showed for 1 more year experience in hog operation, there 
was about 1.5% increase in the possibility that the insurance company was willing to offer 
insurance service.  Within those who had intention to purchase insurance, more experienced 
farmers had a slightly better chance to be offered the service by the company.   
Loan only had significant impact on demand intention in the bivariate partially observed 
model (Model 2). Compared with the demand equation in Model 3, one could infer that a larger 
proportion of farmers who were actually insured had access to credit than those who had positive 
demand intention but were not insured. Or one can say the accessibility to insurance and credit 
are highly correlated.   
Income percentage (inc_pctg) had a positive impact on supply intention. 1% increase in the 
household income percentage from hog operation yielded a 0.3% increase in the possibility to be 
insured. From the insurance provider’s perspective, the company intended to offer service to the 
households whose income came mainly from hog operation, since these household would be 
more likely to take the production procedure seriously than those whose income was more 
diversified. This could be seen as some screening strategy for the insurance company to control 
the risk. 
Log of sow inventory had positive signs for all the 3 models. It was also shown to be the one 
that had the highest marginal effect on the insurance decision. 1% increase in sow inventory 
leaded up to 27% increase in the chance of positive insurance choices. Sow inventory and hog 
inventory could be seen as measures for production scale (hog inventory was removed from the 
model due to its high correlation rate with sow inventory). On one hand, higher production scale 
performed as a good incentive for the farmers to participate into insurance program and a good 
signal to the insurance company that the farm under protection was a serious and promising 
business. One the other hand, the inventories, together with the household income percentage 
played a role as a proxy of the household total wealth. In this sense, the positive sign was also 
consistent with the previous findings that insurance choice was associated with the credit 
constraint. Farmers with higher wealth levels and lower (or non binding) credit constraints were 
more likely the take the insurance. Comparing demand and supply equations, the impact was 
higher on demand intention than supply. The gap could be attributed to the wealth effect. Average sow breeds had a positive impact on the demand side but a slightly negative impact 
on the supply side. The combined marginal effect was about 0.2-0.3%. The different impact on 
demand and supply could be driven by two reasons. On the demand side, the farmers were more 
incentivized to purchase insurance for the sows when they could breed more hogs every year. 
The higher production efficiency made the farmer lose more when facing livestock disease risk. 
However, on the supply side, higher breeds implied more difficulty in monitoring and preventing 
“cheating” behaviors from the claims and hence, lowered the incentive to supply service. In 2009, 
the ear tag identification technology had not been introduced to hog industry. Insurance company 
could only use the farmers’ self reported inventories to make inference and verify the claims. 
Since the average sow breeds per year was the major reason that could change the inventories, it 
turned to be a factor that could impede supply intention. 
Buy vaccine more than required by the local government was proved to increase the chance 
to be offered insurance service from the supply side. Besides, for farmers, choosing to buy extra 
vaccine also differentiate those who were finally insured from the other two groups (those who 
wished to purchase insurance but didn’t get the offer (D=1, S=0) and those who did not want 
insurance, D=0). The actual vaccine cost per hog had positive impact on demand and negative 
impact of supply, and in contrast, average sow vaccine cost seemed to have just the opposite 
impacts, positive on supply and negative on demand. But the overall marginal effects are all 
positive. The swinging effects among the 3 vaccine variable might be due to the correlation and 
common information contained in those variables. Scores that measured the production security 
did not have significant impact in any of the 3 models. 
Based on the log likelihood, the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics is about 36. This means 
the jointly estimated model was proved to be more efficient and accurate than univariate model. 
Since model 3 had a totally different structure of the likelihood functions, the likelihood was not 
comparable to the first two models. The estimated correlation between the demand and supply 
equations was shown to be significant in model 2, but not quite in model 3. One possible 
explanation was with limited information in the partial observation model (model 2) the two 
equations depended on each other for estimation. However, when the demand was identified with 
some extra information (model 3), the two equations no longer needed one another to be 
identified. The implication for this result was the supply decision made by the insurance 
companies was somehow independent to the farmers’ demand intention. It was the farmers’ 
background variables and production behaviors that determined the chance to get an insurance 
offer from the company. On the bottom of the panel, correctness of prediction was listed. On 
average, 80% of those with insurance (Z=1) were predicted correctly and model 3 had the 
highest prediction rate of 94.05%. More than 60% of all (farmer, company) joint choices (Z=1 or 
0) were predicted correctly, with model 2 achieving the highest prediction rate (69.35%).   
5.2 Current Insurance Choices 
Regressions for the current insurance choice (ins_now) were presented in Table-5b. Different 
from section 5.1, positive insurance response here only included those who participated in insurance in the year 2009, but excluded those who took any insurance in the previous years. 
Comparing estimated results with Table-5a, one would find how economic agencies evaluate 
each factor differently between long-term and immediate decisions.     
Within the background variables, age still had positive effect on demand and experience 
years had positive effect on supply with roughly the same magnitude as long-term choices in 
section 5.1. However, different from long-term case, age was also shown to have a positive 
impact on supply and education has a positive impact on demand. Compared with results for 
long-term choices in Table-5a, these effects here seemed only play roles at some certain period, 
but did not make any long-term differences. Interestingly, years working in hog operation now 
had a negative effect on demand. This suggested that for short-term and/or immediate decision, 
there existed some level of overconfidence. Even though this effect did not last very long, more 
experienced farmers were less likely to buy insurance at some certain point of time. 
Household financial situation  loan, production scale lnsowinv  and production efficiency 
sowbreed had same impacts as for long-term case, except that the effect of sowbreed on supply 
turned to be positive now. One possible explanation for this difference could be for short-term 
case, insurance providers consider this production efficiency as positive signal for serious 
production and increase service tendency as the production becoming more efficient. But in the 
long-run, this term was still the main factor that made the real inventory hard to be observed by 
the insurance companies, that is, the higher the efficiency the more difficulty in getting the true 
inventory information from the farmer, and hence the less tendency to offer insurance service.   
For production security, hog vaccine cost had a positive impact on demand, however, sow 
vaccine cost had a negative impact on demand. The different signs could be attributed to the 
constituents of the subject pool. Out of the 187 farmers who were insured in 2009 (and hence had 
ins_now=1), 185 took sow insurance but only 119 took hog insurance (117 took both). When 
farmers  considered  vaccine and insurance as two substitutive methods to prevent livestock 
disease risk, sow vaccine was expected to have negative sign on demand, since only those who 
did not have insurance would spend more on sow vaccine to prevent disease. Meanwhile, if the 
insurance choice behavior could reveal the risk preference or some precautionary habit as 
suggested by classic theory, those who took insurance (but mainly for sow insurance) would 
spend relatively more on hog vaccine as a complement for their risk prevention strategy. This 
latter interpretation was also supported by the significant positive effects of sanitation cost and 
production security scores on demand. These arguments were further verified in section 5.3 
where the insurance choice behaviors were investigated for each single product.   
Same as in the long-term case, the log pseudo-likelihood implied a 34.12 LR test statistics, 
suggesting the joint estimation being more efficient than single equation model. The percentage 
correct prediction achieved to about 65%. Comparing the single- and double-equation model, the 
percentage rates were also in favor of the latter.   
5.3 Insurance Choices by Type – Hog and Sow Table-5c and 5d listed the results for hog insurance choices and sow insurance choices 
respectively. Most results were consistent to those previous two tables. Slight changes in effects 
of vaccine costs in Table-5c further supported the substitution and complement interpretation 
between vaccine and insurance. Since most of the farmers who took hog insurance also took sow 
insurance, sow vaccine still had negative effects on demand (substitution effect remained). But 
since the target insurance type now was only hog, the hog vaccine effect became less significant 
(hog vaccine began to switch from a complementary strategy to substitutive).     
 
6. Discussion 
There are a few interesting points that need further discussion. 
First, it has long been argued that the endogeneity problem between insurance decisions and 
production choices always makes the causal effect hard to be identified correctly. In this study, 
the insurance choices and production security behaviors (such as vaccine costs and sanitation 
costs) were jointly determined by some long-term unobservable risk preference and individual 
characteristics. There also existed some complicated short-term interactions resulting from 
potential adverse selection and moral hazard problems. To address endogeneity problem, we 
used some production behavior variables in the previous years, such as vaccine costs and 
sanitation costs in 2007 and 2008 as instruments for those of 2009. Two-stage regressions results 
(not presented in the paper due to space limit.) were consistent with previous results and 
Hausman test failed to reject the difference between the two methods. However, one should still 
admit that the method used here might be effective in controlling the short-term endogenous 
problem, but had limited power in controlling for the long-term unobervables. 
Second, different proxies of the same underlying variables had different relative explanatory 
powers. Sow inventory and hog inventory were used as proxies for production scale directly and 
wealth level indirectly. But sow inventory, though smaller in absolute value, always represented 
higher prediction power than hog inventory. When each variable was used alone in the model, 
consistently positive sign was predicted, with sow inventory having more significant results. 
However, when both variables were used together in the model, the predicted sign for hog 
inventory turned to be either negative or insignificant. Moreover, when the two inventories 
together with income percentage were jointly used to proxy wealth level, even sow inventory 
was dominated by the newly generated wealth proxy, although by theory it should not make any 
difference in the reduced form model. 
Third, estimated coefficients were a bit sensitive to the different combination of explanatory 
variables, suggesting some potential multicollinearity problems. To address this, similar variables 
within each category group were selected to be used in the model (i.e. to use sow inventory but 
not hog inventory, to use sanitation cost but not medicine cost, etc).   
Fourth,  compared to Model 3, it was hard to differentiate demand equation and supply 
equation from the Model 2 (bivariate probit model with partial observability). In model 3, one observed binary supply intentions only when demand was identified to be positive (i.e. D=1). In 
practical, model 3 was merely bivariate choices with sample selection and hence, it was easy to 
differentiate the demand and supply equations from one another. However, in model 2, since one 
could only observe positive insurance outcome (i.e. Z=1), two equations shared the same 
dependent variable Z. As a result, equations could only be differentiated from assuming different 
functional forms. For example, in section 5 we differentiated two equations by assuming that 
loan  affected demand only. This assumption was partially verified by comparing regression 
results in model 2 and model 3 and observing roughly same patterns within two demand 
equations and two supply ones. 
For future study, it would be interesting if one could further partition the sample pool for the 
long-term insurance choice into two groups (one for currently insured, the other for preciously 
insured) and make comparison to get  more direct results between long-term and short-term 
differences. Multi-level discrete choice model and/or nested model could be used to investigate 
the relative preference between sow insurance and hog insurance. At last, with insurance choices 
in 2 consecutive years, panel regression could not only generate more accurate estimation, but 
also shed light on the changings in the decisions across years. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper aimed to offer some explanations  for the low participation rate of the hog 
insurance in China. By partially observing insurance demand and jointly estimating demand and 
supply intentions, this study made clear how economic factors impact farmers’ demand and 
insurance companies’ supply differently. 4 insurance responses were studied. Comparisons were 
made between past (or ever)  insurance choices  and current insurance choices, and between 
different insurance products (hog and sow).   
Results showed positive impact of credit accessibility and wealth level on insurance take-up 
rate, but also suggested demand side put more weights on these factors than supply side when 
making decisions on this interactive game. Farmers past experience in hog operation was proved 
to increase the chance of being offered insurance services, however, under certain circumstance, 
more experience impeded the farmers to take insurance, implying  some evidence for 
overconfident behaviors. This study also tested the effects of production efficiency on both sides 
of the market. A more efficient and productive farm had higher tendency to take insurance, but 
due to asymmetric information and difficulty in monitoring, the higher efficiency might be 
considered as some disadvantages from the suppliers’ prospective. Some production security 
behaviors were also shown to have substitution effect on insurance take-up decisions.     
A better understanding about the insurance choice behaviors and how specific factors impact 
insurance choice on both demand and supply sides can help to promote insurance participation so 
as to reduce production risk, smooth income flow, stabilize market supply and increase food 
security. The insurance suppliers will also benefit for marketing development strategies.  
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   Table-1: Insurance Outcome Status 
Z  Definition  Obs.  Mean  SD 
Insurance  Have ever participated in any insurance or not, 1 or 0  528  0.48  0.50 
ins_now2  Is currently insured or not, either hog or sow, 1 or 0  531  0.35  0.48 
ins_hog  Currently have hog insurance or not, 1 or 0  531  0.22  0.42 
ins_sow  Currently have sow insurance or not, 1 or 0  531  0.35  0.48 
 
 
Table-2: Demand & Supply Identification Rule 






2  SD 
A  Premium is too high.  0  in conclusive  414  0.55  0.50 
B  Product pool is too narrow.  1  Z  414  0.14  0.35 
C  Coverage is too low.  1  Z  414  0.13  0.34 
D  Claim is not fair.  1  Z  414  0.12  0.32 
E  Insurance company doesn't allow me to.  1  Z  414  0.08  0.27 
F  I am not familiar with ag insurance.  1  Z  414  0.12  0.33 
G  The procedure is too complicated.  1  Z  414  0.11  0.31 
1: those who are currently insured or never quit do not response to this question. 
2: Multiple choices allowed. 
   Table-3: Demand and Supply with Partial Identification   
   Z=1  Z=0  Z=0    
   D=1, S=1  D=1, S=0  D=0  Total 
Insurance  252  126  118  496 
 
50.81%  25.40%  23.79% 
  ins_now2  187  132  155  474 
 
39.45%  27.85%  32.70% 
  ins_hog  119  161  182  462 
 
25.76%  34.85%  39.39% 
  ins_sow  185  133  155  473 
   39.11%  28.12%  32.77%    
 
   Table-4: Summary Statistics (Insurance) 
              
         
Insurance=1  
                 
Insurance=0  
               
Insurance=0  
     
                     
All  D=1, S=1 
                 
D=1, S=0  
                   
D=0  
Group  Vars.  Definition  Mean  Sd  Mean  Sd  Mean  Sd  Mean  Sd 
HH Demo.  age  age of household  46.20  7.68  46.47  7.32  45.76  7.86  45.03  8.00 
 
edu  education years  7.15  2.54  7.43  2.73  7.13  2.25  6.93  2.35 
 
year  years work in hog raising  8.65  4.91  9.17  4.93  8.03  4.60  7.66  4.41 
 
loan  Have loan or not, 1 or 0  0.34  0.47  0.40  0.49  0.31  0.46  0.27  0.45 
Production  inc_pctg  % income from hog raising  74.89  21.03  78.60  19.01  70.16  25.99  74.41  18.63 
Scale  lnhog_inv  log of hog inventory  5.76  0.93  6.11  0.95  5.42  0.84  5.63  0.60 
 
lnsow_inv  log of sow inventory  3.59  0.97  3.95  0.99  3.24  0.85  3.42  0.69 
Efficiency  sowbreed  No. of breeds per sow per year  16.56  3.63  16.58  3.45  17.81  3.35  15.98  3.74 
 
breedfrq  annual breed frequency  2.13  0.16  2.12  0.14  2.15  0.18  2.11  0.15 
Security  buy_vac  vaccine more than required, 1, 0  0.49  0.50  0.57  0.50  0.38  0.49  0.43  0.50 
 
vac_hog  vaccine cost per hog  5.72  6.11  5.89  6.17  6.74  6.89  5.14  5.50 
 
vac_sow  vaccine cost per sow  20.80  17.05  22.92  21.80  19.37  12.20  20.00  9.94 
 
lnquarcost  log of total sanitation cost  6.10  2.28  6.98  1.93  5.33  2.31  5.28  2.27 
 
lnmedcost  log of total medicine cost  7.39  2.37  8.25  1.92  6.48  2.63  6.72  2.34 
   score  production security score, 0-22  15.20  4.06  15.74  4.08  14.94  3.92  15.45  2.92 
 
 Table-5a: Probit Prediction (Insurance)   
 
Uni-Probit  Bi-Probit Partial Obs.  Bi-Probit Demand Identified 
VAR  ins  M.E.  ins_s  ins_d  M.E.
1  ins_s  ins_d  M.E.
1 
           
 
  
      age  0.0118  0.0047  0.0036  0.0308*  0.0012  -0.0041  0.027**  0.0063 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
edu  0.0108  0.0043  0.0293  -0.0134  0.0091  -0.0172  0.0479  0.0083 
   (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
year  0.0156  0.0062  0.048**  -0.0055  0.0148  0.0298  -0.0003  0.0086 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
loan  0.1640  0.0655     1.658***    
 
0.2650  0.0717 
   (0.16)  (0.06)     (0.49)    
 
(0.19)  (0.05) 
inc_pctg  0.0023  0.0009  0.0084*  -0.0066  0.0028  0.0046  -0.0032  0.0005 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
lnsowinv  0.578***  0.2306  0.384**  1.076***  0.1368  0.377**  0.59***  0.2738 
   (0.14)  (0.06)  (0.18)  (0.23)  (0.07)  (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.05) 
breedfrq  0.4710  0.1878  0.6070  -0.9010  0.2703  -0.1210  1.0920  0.2680 
   (0.65)  (0.26)  (0.80)  (1.03)  (0.30)  (0.76)  (0.74)  (0.24) 
sowbreed  0.0146  0.0058  -0.0645  0.104***  -0.025  -0.0557*  0.069**  0.0029 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
buy_vac  0.446***  0.1767  0.360*  0.546**  0.1373  0.443**  0.0683  0.1465 
   (0.17)  (0.07)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.06) 
hogvac_09  -0.0029  -0.001  -0.049**  0.248***  -0.018  -0.033**  0.0345*  0.0000 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
sowvac_09  0.0011  0.0004  0.0119*  -0.028***  0.0047  0.0095*  -0.0078  0.0006 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
lnquarcost  0.166***  0.0664  0.19***  0.144**  0.0710  0.0804  0.12***  0.0554 
   (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
score  -0.0300  -0.012  -0.0335  -0.0193  -0.009  -0.0289  -0.0447  -0.021 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
athrho        1205***        -0.959       
         (2.20)        (0.73)       
Pseudo lnL  -184.544     -166.86        -274.588       
Wald X
2(df)  80.09(13)   107.12(25)     32.94(12) 
% correct
2  80.56     84.13  
 
   94.05  
    % correct
3  66.73     69.35 
 
   60.48 
    Obs.  340     340 
 
   327 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
1: Marginal effect for positive outcomes (s=1, d=1) 
2: % correct prediction for insured. 
3: % correct prediction for all. 
   Table-5b: Probit Prediction (Ins_now) 
   Uni-Probit  Bi-Probit Partial Obs.  Bi-Probit Demand Iden. 
VARIABLES  ins_now  M.E.  ins_now_s  ins_now_d  ins_now_s  ins_now_d 
     
 
        
  age  0.0241**  0.0091  0.0282**  0.0522  0.0189*  0.0231** 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
edu  0.0399  0.0151  0.0294  0.1820  0.0372  0.0527** 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.12)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
year  0.0042  0.0016  0.0372*  -0.168**  0.0033  0.0235 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
loan  0.0228  0.0086     11.22*     0.0983 
   (0.16)  (0.06)     (6.00)     (0.13) 
inc_pctg  -0.0002  -0.0001  0.0020  -0.0246  -0.0011  -0.0015 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
lnsowinv  0.265**  0.0999  -0.0332  2.668***  0.359***  0.1590 
   (0.13)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.81)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
breedfrq  -0.1690  -0.0637  -0.3240 
 
-0.7530 
     (0.64)  (0.24)  (0.63) 
 
(0.49) 
  sowbreed  0.0412  0.0155  0.0114  0.278***  0.0533**  0.0721*** 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
buy_vac  0.2330  0.0879  0.0325  0.801***  0.1920  -0.359*** 
   (0.16)  (0.06)  (0.17)  (0.29)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
hogvac_09  0.0030  0.0011  -0.0273*  0.441***  0.0078  0.0316** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.14)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
sowvac_09  -0.0215***  -0.0081  -0.0041  -0.229***  -0.0236***  -0.0287*** 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
lnquarcost_09  0.162***  0.0609  0.149***  0.654***  0.170***  0.120*** 
   (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.17)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
score  0.0375  0.0141  0.0546*  0.114***  0.0460**  0.0282 
   (0.03) 
 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
athrho        1427***     11.85    
         (2.11)     (16.12)    
Pseudo lnL  -193.884     -176.831       
  Wald X
2(df)  54.65(13)     2749.38(24)    
  % correct
2  55.61      65.24      65.24  
  % correct
3  64.77     66.88     66.46 
  Observations  341     341     325 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
1: Marginal effect for positive outcomes (s=1, d=1) 
2: % correct prediction for insured. 
3: % correct prediction for all. 
 Table-5c: Probit Prediction (Ins_hog)   
   Uni-Probit  Bi-Probit Partial Obs.  Bi-Probit Demand Iden. 
VARIABLES  ins_hog  M.E.  ins_hog_s  ins_hog_d  M.E.
1  ins_hog_s  ins_hog_d  M.E.
1 
           
 
  
      age  0.0023  0.0007  -0.116***  0.0359**  0.0123  -0.0035  0.0249**  -0.0011 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
edu  0.0434  0.0129  0.110*  0.0334  0.0115  0.0648*  0.0767**  0.0209 
   (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
year  0.0206  0.0061  0.209***  -0.0101  -0.0035  0.0212  0.0193  0.0068 
   (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
loan  0.2420  0.0735     0.510***  0.1801 
 
0.327** 
     (0.17)  (0.05)     (0.19)  (0.07) 
 
(0.14) 
  inc_pctg  0.0009  0.0003  0.0324***  -0.0084  -0.0029  -0.0012  -0.0028  -0.0004 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
lnhoginv  -0.0224  -0.0066  0.2150  -0.1000  -0.0344  0.1800  0.0910  0.0583 
   (0.13)  (0.04)  (0.18)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.04) 
breedfrq  -0.7790  -0.2312  -2.888**  -0.7640  -0.2626  -0.5880  0.9910  -0.1898 
   (0.70)  (0.21)  (1.17)  (0.76)  (0.26)  (0.61)  (0.64)  (0.20) 
sowbreed  0.0108  0.0032  -0.0536  0.0360  0.0124  0.0098  0.0272  0.0032 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01) 
buy_vac  0.322*  0.0960  -1.346***  0.672***  0.2301  0.1810  -0.439***  0.0583 
   (0.17)  (0.05)  (0.45)  (0.19)  (0.07)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.05) 
hogvac_09  -0.0014  -0.0004  0.0412  -0.0078  -0.0027  0.0008  0.0337**  0.0002 
   (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
sowvac_09  -0.0157**  -0.0047  -0.0190  -0.0210**  -0.0072  -0.0136*  -0.0268***  -0.0044 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
lnquarcost_09  0.125***  0.0370  0.180**  0.141***  0.0485  0.141***  0.0987***  0.0454 
   (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
score  0.0889***  0.0264  0.140**  0.0961***  0.0330  0.0785***  0.0566**  0.0254 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
athrho        140.1***        16.91       
         (1.34)        (38.49)       
Pseudo lnL  -164.7075     -150.9582        -279.6576       
Wald X
2(df)  46.89(13)     74.98(25) 
 
   196819.22(12) 
  % correct
2  52.94      56.30  
 
   58.82  
    % correct
3  66.67     67.32 
 
   68.40 
    Observations  342     342 
 
   303 
    Robust standard errors in parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
1: Marginal effect for positive outcomes (s=1, d=1) 
2: % correct prediction for insured. 
3: % correct prediction for all. 
   Table-5d: Probit Prediction (Ins_sow)   
   Uni-Probit  Bi-Probit Partial Obs.  Bi-Probit Demand Iden. 
VARIABLES  ins_sow  M.E.  ins_sow_s  ins_sow_d  M.E.
1  ins_sow_s  ins_sow_d  M.E.
1 
           
 
  
      age  0.0198*  0.0075  0.0191  0.0255**  0.0101  0.0191*  0.0317***  0.0075 
   (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
edu  0.0415  0.0158  0.445***  -0.0541  -0.0215  0.0475  0.0533  0.0187 
   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.01) 
year  0.0085  0.0032  0.0179  0.0213  0.0085  0.0022  0.0184  0.0009 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
loan  0.0150  0.0057     0.1870  0.0744 
 
0.245* 
     (0.16)  (0.06)     (0.16)  (0.06) 
 
(0.14) 
  inc_pctg  0.0014  0.0005  0.0176**  -0.0064  -0.0026  0.0005  -0.0017  0.0002 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
lnsowinv  0.1480  0.0564  0.528**  0.1310  0.0523  0.302**  0.1320  0.1189 
   (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.23)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.05) 
breedfrq  0.2880  0.1100  1.3130  -0.2480  -0.0987  0.3690  1.426**  0.1453 
   (0.60)  (0.23)  (1.07)  (0.70)  (0.28)  (0.58)  (0.62)  (0.24) 
sowbreed  0.0409*  0.0156  -0.0255  0.0586**  0.0233  0.0419**  0.0543***  0.0165 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
buy_vac  0.1000  0.0382  -0.745***  0.368**  0.1459  0.1150  -0.379**  0.0452 
   (0.15)  (0.06)  (0.28)  (0.17)  (0.06)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.07) 
lnquarcost_09  0.161***  0.0614  0.434***  0.0740  0.0295  0.159***  0.0998***  0.0626 
   (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
score  0.0371  0.0141  -0.0209  0.0528**  0.0210  0.0299  0.0119  0.0118 
   (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
athrho        111.7*** 
 
   33.606*** 
             (1.00) 
 
   (7.19) 
    Pseudo lnL  -208.5556     -197.1048        -297.4707       
Wald X
2(df)  50.13(11)     72.80(21) 
 
   53.13(10) 
    % correct
2  57.84      61.62  
 
   61.08  
    % correct
3  60.04     61.10 
 
   60.04 
    Obs.  353     353        320       
Robust standard errors in parentheses                
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                   
1: Marginal effect for positive outcomes (s=1, d=1) 
2: % correct prediction for insured. 
3: % correct prediction for all. 